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Abstract 
From a national defense, as well as a civilian infrastructure perspective, a need exists to design and develop systems 
resilient to disruption.  Disruptions are often difficult to predict or may be potentially unavoidable.  Systems able to 
survive and recover from disruption are referred to as resilient.  In the case of mission critical systems, such as 
command and control systems, resilience is a necessary characteristic and must be considered early in the 
development cycle.  This paper describes a quantitative approach to evaluating the expected resilience of a command 
and control system.  The approach uses a Petri Net based executable model of the system architecture.    The rigorous 
graph-theoretic and executable properties of Petri Nets are leveraged to support static and dynamic measures of the 
attributes of resilience.  These measures are then combined into a holistic evaluation of resilience for the command 
and control system under study.  The evaluation results can then be used to support selection among alternative 
candidate architectures and to identify areas for improvement in the selected architecture.   
 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection  
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1. Introduction 
The word ‘resilience’ is derived from the Latin words ‘resilire’ and ‘resilio’ which meant: “the ability 
to rebound or jump-back.”  The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines 
resilience as “the ability of organizational, hardware and software systems to mitigate the severity and 
likelihood of failures or losses, to adapt to changing conditions, and to respond appropriately after the 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: 703-784-0605; fax: not available. 
E-mail address: pflanz_mark@bah.com 
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
142  Mark Pflanz and Alexander Levis / Procedia Computer Science 8 (2012) 141 – 146
Mark Pflanz / ProcediaComputer Science 00 (2012) 000–000 
fact” [1].  Many other highly related definitions for resilience have been developed, however all involve 
the following common themes: avoidance, survival, recovery, disruption.  Therefore, we will use the 
following definition of resilience from [2]: the ability to avoid, survive and recover from disruption.   
The objective of this paper is to describe a quantitative approach to measuring the expected resilience 
of a command and control system based on its architecture.  The main idea is that resilience can be 
measured through its attributes, and that these measures may be combined into a holistic evaluation of 
resilience. To illustrate this approach, we consider the resilience of a command and control system to 
exercise or implement a capability to a disruption.  While the approach has broad reaching implications, 
the scope of this paper is limited to command and control systems and does not address the avoidance or 
recovery phases described in [2].  Section 2 highlights key aspects in resilience that must be considered in 
any evaluation.  Section 3 describes the attributes of resilience and their measures.  Section 4 introduces a 
holistic means of combining the measures.  Section 5 concludes the paper with observations and future 
work. 
2. Key Topics in Considering Resilience 
Resilience includes the notion of disruption.  INCOSE defines disruption as “the initiating event of a 
reduction in performance. A disruption may be either a sudden or a sustained event…” [1]. Jackson [2] 
defines disruptions as events which jeopardize a system’s ability to perform its intended capabilities.  
An evaluation of resilience must also include temporal aspects.  Timescales may vary based upon the 
system under consideration.  However, the timescale can be normalized to allow for fairer comparisons.  
Figure 1 illustrates the significance of time when examining resilience and is originally described in [6].    
 
In Fig. 1, phases of resilience identified in [2] are overlaid on the time axis.  The evaluation begins at 
some initial time, defined as time t0.  A disruption occurs at time td.  The system reaches some minimum 
operating performance level at time tmin, and returns to a pre-disruption state at time tret.  The avoidance 
phase of resilience runs from time t0 to time td, the survival phase runs from time td to tmin, and the 
recovery phase runs from tmin to tret.  The performance is evaluated using a Measure of Performance (MoP) 
for a single capability of the system as described by the architecture.   During the avoidance phase, a 
system is operating at some normal operating level of capability, defined above as Value2 (V2).  The level 
of capability decreases to some minimum value, V1, at time tmin when a disruption occurs at time td.   The 
system has a minimum threshold level of capability, VT, below which performance is deemed un-
acceptable, or below which a catastrophic failure could result.  
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Fig. 1:  Temporal Aspects in Evaluating Resilience 
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The proposed approach uses the architecture of a command and control system to evaluate its 
resilience.  Architecture is defined as “the fundamental organization of a system, embodied in its 
components, their relationships to each other and the environment, and the principles governing its design 
and evolution” [3].  In simple terms, we can view the architecture as the high-level design of the system.  
Architects develop the overall design, while engineers design and deliver systems which conform to that 
architecture.   By representing the architecture of a system in a rigorous way, one can analyze the design 
for key properties, and simulate the design to examine for desired performance and behavior aspects.  In 
this manner, one can make decisions and improvements far earlier in the process, saving time, money and 
ultimately delivering better results.   
Petri Net based architecture models are used for a number of reasons.  They are rigorous (meaning that 
defined mathematical models underlie all aspects of Petri Net theory), visualize-able because of its graph 
theoretic underpinnings, and executable.  These properties of Petri Nets support analyzing structural, 
behavioral, and performance characteristics of the architecture via simulation as well as static analyses.  
Finally, established and traceable means exist for translating other architectural approaches (for example 
Business Process Model and Notation or BPMN) into Petri Net format.     
3. The Attributes of Resilience and Their Measures 
On the basis of the existing body of resilience knowledge, Jackson [2] defines four primary attributes 
which characterize resilience: tolerance, flexibility, capacity, and inter-element collaboration.  The authors 
in [10] later re-describe inter-element collaboration as cohesion. This approach retains the term inter-
element collaboration because cohesion is already used in [6] and [9] in a distinctly different manner.  The 
approach described in this paper partially redefines the attributes in [2] and extends them to better support 
the overall evaluation of resilience.  Tolerance is the ability to degrade gracefully after a disruption or 
attack.  Flexibility is the ability of a system to reorganize its elements to maintain its capabilities at 
degraded or even pre-disruption levels.  Capacity is the ability to operate at a certain level as defined by a 
given measure.  We further define capacity as the available capability margin between current operating 
levels and minimum threshold operating levels.  Inter-Element Collaboration describes unplanned 
cooperation within a system (typically an organization) to share resources or work together in new ways.  
Inter-element collaboration involves the emergent properties, often human-related, of many systems and is 
not considered in this evaluation approach.  
Tolerance is the ability to degrade gracefully after a disruption or attack.  To measure graceful 
degradation, we consider the rate of departure (TolRD) from normal operating conditions.  Rate of 
Departure (TolRD) is the rate of change over time in system effectiveness in meeting its requirements.  
This encapsulates both the temporal aspects of resilience (td and tmin), as well as the effectiveness aspects 
of how the system performs with respect to its requirements and how effectiveness changes during the 
survival phase (post disruption). Effectiveness can be measured by comparing the system performance 
with respect to defined Measures of Performance (MoP) against the corresponding requirements. Papers 
[4] and [5] describe a methodology of comparing system performance to system requirements as the 
intersection of the locus of performance (Lp) and the locus of requirements (Lr).  System performance is 
characterized by the applicable MoP selected by system development team.  The performance locus 
describes the range of system performance in the defined MoP space as the parameters of various 
situations are varied according to expected conditions.  The requirements locus defines the required 
system performance levels over the same MoP space.  To examine the intersection of the performance and 
requirements locus, a scenario is required.  Parameters of interest (e.g. response time, or inter-arrival time) 
are varied to form a parameter locus.  The executable architecture is simulated at each point in the 
parameter locus to determine the locus of performance.  The two loci, Lp and Lr, are then depicted in a 
common reference frame.  System effectiveness at meeting the established requirements is determined by 
measuring the intersection of the two loci in the common reference frame.  While the approach in [4] and 
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[5] is static, this approach adds time.  Specifically, the intersection of Lp and Lr is measured at pre-
disruption (prior to td) and post disruption (at tmin) time periods, and computed using Equation (1) yielding 
in a change of effectiveness per unit of time.  Figure 2 shows an abstract visualization of rate of departure.   
 
  
 
 
     
                         (1) 
 
 
Other means of measuring 
tolerance exist and are discussed in 
[6].  For example, resilient systems 
also typically exhibit high fault 
tolerance: they continue providing 
their main functionality despite the 
occurrence of one or more element-
level failures.  A second measure of 
tolerance, fault tolerance, examines 
the elements that can fail prior to a 
loss of capability using cut 
vertexes. A third measure of 
tolerance, point of failure tolerance, 
examines the relatedness of 
individual failures to a loss of overall capability.  When considering faults, it is important to understand 
the relatedness of failures at the element level to a loss of functionality or a loss of capability; whether 
single element level failures tend to induce a failure of the entire system or large portions of the system.   
In contrast to tolerance, flexibility is the ability of a system to reorganize and adapt itself to changing 
conditions.  Flexibility is an enabler of adjustment used by many systems to maintain their functionality 
during the changing conditions which follow a disruption.  The graph theoretic interpretation of Petri Nets 
can be used to examine flexibility.  Valraud and Levis [7] demonstrated the use of Petri net place-
invariants to describe information flow paths and functionalities in an architecture.  In their approach, a 
simple information flow path corresponds to a simple functionality of the system described by the 
architecture.  A complete information flow path is obtained by coalescing all of the simple information 
flow paths terminating in a common sink.  A complete information flow path corresponds to a complete 
functionality described by the architecture and defined as the partially ordered set of functions that 
generate a specific output.  A capability is then the instantiation of one or more related complete 
functionalities.  A well known technique to solve for the place-invariants of Petri Nets is provided in [8].   
The flexibility of an architecture proposed for a certain capability can be measured by Proportion of 
Use.  Proportion of Use (PoU) reflects the fraction of the total elements used by any given simple 
functionality to deliver the overall capability.  For example, does the average functionality use 10% of the 
elements, or 80% of the elements supporting that capability?  Systems with low proportion of use are 
more resilient to a disruption, since each element is involved in comparatively fewer simple 
functionalities, and easier to reorganize, because elements are less extensively used in the capability.  
Systems with high proportions of use are less resilient to disruption, since elements tend to be involved in 
comparatively more simple functionalities for a given capability, and more difficult to reorganize, because 
each element is extensively involved in the simple functionalities needed to deliver the overall capability.  
PoU implies substitutable elements.  A separate measure further described in [6], fault tolerance, uses cut 
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vertexes to indirectly examine element criticality and loss of functionality.  Proportion of Use is defined in 
Equation (2).  A second means of measuring flexibility using the graph-theoretic properties of Petri Nets 
is defined in [9]. 
 
 
 
 
                    (2) 
 
where: 
r = total number of information flow paths ℓ 
Bi = number of elements e contained by path ℓi 
E = total number of element  
 
There are three primary means of addressing capacity when time is also considered.  Buffering 
Capacity is the capability margin available immediately at the time of disruption or attack.  Reactive 
Capacity accounts for the fact that certain systems are able to bring additional capacity on line after a 
given reaction time, defined as trc.  This allows for the system to increase capacity to some maximum 
value, Vmax.  Given a system survives a disruption, Residual Capacity describes the remaining capacity 
above the threshold requirements and captures system vulnerability to a follow-on disruption that might 
occur in quick succession to the original disruption.  Figure 3 describes how to compute each aspect of 
capacity when considering time.  Figure 3 was originally described in [6].  
 
 
4. Combining the Measures to Evaluate Resilience 
Section 3 defined measures for each attribute of resilience: capacity, tolerance, flexibility.  A holistic 
evaluation is possible by first, selecting the appropriate metric for each attribute; second, measuring the 
architecture’s performance against each metric; and third, comparing the architecture’s performance 
against a required performance level for each attribute.  Resilience-related improvements to the design 
can now be quantified and alternative architectures can be compared.  The idea is to evaluate the 
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resilience performance of the baseline 
architecture against the resilience 
requirements established by the system 
developers.  Then either compare the 
baseline against alternative architectures, 
or make improvements to the baseline to 
move its performance into a desired 
range.  (Fig. 4)   
5. Comments and Conclusions 
This paper has described a quantitative 
means to evaluating the expected 
resilience of a command and control 
system using its architecture.  The key 
idea has been to use measures for each of 
the attributes of resilience, and then to 
combine these measures into a holistic assessment.  By representing the architecture in a rigorous way 
using Petri nets, the approach supports simulation of the architecture and the analysis of properties based 
on structure.  This allows us to examine the expected performance (by executing the Petri net based 
architecture) and structural characteristics, such as analysis of the simple information flow paths of the 
architecture.  Two case studies demonstrating the approach are available in [6].  However, this work 
focused on the survival phase of resilience and did not address recovery or avoidance phases.  While 
flexibility does in part address characteristics beneficial during a recovery phase, such as the ability to 
reorganize, further research is needed to identify a complete end-to-end assessment of resilience that 
would include the avoidance, survival, and recovery phases.  
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